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Abstract. We consider multi-agent argumentation, where each agent’s
view of the arguments is encoded as an argumentation framework (AF).
Then we study deliberative processes than can occur on this basis. We
think of a deliberative process as taking the shape of a stepwise aggre-
gation of a single joint AF, and we are interested in reasoning about the
space of possible outcomes. The only restriction we place on deliberative
processes is that they should satisfy faithfulness, a postulate amounting
to requiring that whenever deliberation leads to a new relationship being
introduced between two arguments, this relationship is endorsed by at
least one participating agent. We use modal logic to reason about the
resulting deliberative structures, and we provide some technical results
on model checking. We also give an example and suggest some directions
for future work.
1 Introduction
We study agency and argumentation, and propose a framework for modeling and
reasoning about deliberation. In short, we assume that some agents are given,
with their own individual view of the argumentation scenario at hand, and that
deliberation is a process by which we attempt to reconcile all these individual
views to aggregate a joint, common view on the situation, which we may then
analyze further using established techniques from argumentation theory. We de-
velop our framework based on the formal theory of argumentation introduced by
Dung [5], which has attracted much interested from the AI community, see [9]
for a recent volume devoted to this theory. In keeping with recent trends, we also
take advantage of logical tools, relying both on a truth-functional three-valued
view of argumentation [1,6], and on the use of modal logic [8,7].
Unlike much previous work in argumentation theory, including work done on
multi-agent argumentative interaction (see, for instance, [9, Chapter 13]), we do
not worry about attempting to design procedures for “good” deliberation, but
focus instead on a logical analysis of the space of possible outcomes, assuming
only a minimal restriction on the nature of the deliberative processes that we
consider permissible. The restriction encodes the intuition that the common view
aggregated by deliberation should be built in such a way that we only make use
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of information already present in the view of some agent. This, indeed, seems
like a safe requirement, and appears to be one that no reasonable group of agents
would ever want to deviate from.
We remark that our concept of deliberation is also somewhat unusual com-
pared to earlier work in that we focus on processes that aim to reconcile rep-
resentations of the argumentative situation, rather than processes where agents
interact based on their different judgments about a given structure. While we will
not argue extensively for the appropriateness of this shift of attention, we men-
tion that it is prima facie reasonable: if two agents judge a situation differently
it seems safe to assume that they must have a reason for doing so. Moreover,
while this reason could sometimes be due to disagreement about purely logical
principles or atomic (i.e., unanalyzable) differences in preference, it seems clear
that in real life, disagreement arises just as often, perhaps more often, as a result
of a difference in interpretation, i.e., from the fact that the agents have different
mental representations of the situation at hand.
In fact, in this paper we will refrain from committing to a particular view
on judgments, and we will set up our logical framework in such a way that
it allows us to use any semantics from formal argumentation as the source of
basic judgments about arguments given a framework. Our own focus is solely on
the stepwise, iterative development of a common framework, and on the logical
analysis of the different ways in which such a process may unfold, by way of a
logical treatment of the modalities that arise from quantifying over the space of
possible deliberative futures.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give a background on
abstract argumentation, concluding by an example that motivates our logic and
a definition of normality, which allows us to parameterize our constructions by
any normal argumentation semantics (all semantics of which we are aware are
normal). Then in Section 3 we introduce deliberative dynamic logic (ddl), a con-
crete suggestion for a logical framework allowing us to reason about deliberative
processes using modal logic. Then in Section 4 we show that while our mod-
els are generally infinite, model checking is still feasible since we may “shrink”
them, by restricting attention only to the relevant parts of the structure. Then,
in Section 5, we conclude and discuss directions for future work.
2 Background on abstract argumentation
Following Dung [5] we represent argumentation structures by directed graphs
F = (S,E), such that S is a set of arguments and E ⊆ S × S encode the
attacks between them, i.e., such that if (x, y) ∈ E then the argument x attacks y.
Traditionally, most work in formal argumentation theory has focused on defining
and investigating notions of successful sets of arguments, in a setting where the
argumentation framework is given and remains fixed. Such notions are typically
formalized by an argumentation semantics, an operator ε which returns, for any
AF F, the set of sets of arguments from F = (S,E) that are regarded as successful
combinations, i.e., such that ε(F) ⊆ 2S . Many proposals exists in the literature,
we point to [2] for a survey and formal comparison of different semantics. While
some semantics, such as the grounded and ideal semantics, return a unique set
of arguments, the “winners” of the argumentation scenario encoded by F, most
semantics return more than one possible collection of arguments that would be
successful if they were held together. For instance, the admissible semantics,
upon which many of the other well-known semantics are built, returns, for each
AF F, the following sets of arguments:
a(F) = {A ⊆ S | E−(A) ⊆ E+(A) ⊆ S \A}
Where E−(X) are the nodes which has an arrow into X, and E+(X) are
the nodes which the nodes in X has an arrow into. That is, the admissible
sets are those that can defend themselves against attacks (first inclusion), and
do not involve any internal conflicts (second inclusion). A strengthening that is
widely considered more appropriate (yet incurs some computational costs) is the
preferred semantics p, which is defined by taking only those admissible sets that
are set-theoretically maximal, i.e., such that they are not contained in any other
admissible set. In general, an AF admits many preferred sets, and even more
admissible ones. Indeed, notice that the empty set is always admissible by the
default (the inappropriateness of which provides partial justification for using
preferred semantics instead). As a simple example, consider F below.
F : p 66 q
ww
a(F) = {∅, {p}, {q}}, p(F) = {{p}, {q}}}
Indeed, it seems hard to say which one of p and q should be regarded as suc-
cessful in such a scenario. In the absence of any additional information, it seems
safest to concede that choosing either one will be a viable option. Alternatively,
one may take the view that due to the undetermined nature of the scenario,
it should not be permitted to regard either argument as truly successful. This,
indeed, is the view taken by unique status semantics, such as the grounded and
ideal semantics. However, while such a restrictive view might be appropriate in
some circumstance, it seems unsatisfactory for a general theory of argumenta-
tion. Surely, in most real-world argumentation situations, it is not tenable for an
arbitrator to refrain from making a judgment whenever doing so would involve
some degree of discretion on his part.
Since argumentation semantics typically only restrict the choice of successful
arguments, without determining it completely, a modal notion of acceptance
arises, usually referred to as skeptical acceptance in argumentation parlance,
whereby an argument is said to be skeptically accepted by F under ε if ∀S ∈
ε(F) : p ∈ S. The dual notion is called credulous acceptance, and obtains just in
case ∃S ∈ ε(F) : p ∈ S. Moreover, since the choice among elements of ε(F) can
itself be a contentious issue, and is not one which can be satisfactorily resolved by
single-agent argumentation theory, there has been research devoted to giving an
account of multi-agent interaction concerning the choice among members of ε(F),
see [4,10]. While this is interesting, it seems that another aspect of real-world
argumentation has an even stronger multi-agent flavor, namely the process by
which one arrives at a common AF in the first place. Certainly, two agents, a and
b, might disagree about whether to choose p or q in F considered above, but as
it stands, such a choice appears arbitrary and, most likely, the two agents would
also be willing to admit as much. Arguably, then, the disagreement itself is only
superficial. The agents disagree, but they provide no reason for their different
preferences, and do not provide any content or structure to substantiate them.
This leaves an arbitrator in much the same position as he was in before: he might
note the different opinions raised, but he has no basis upon which to inquire into
their merits, and so his choice must, eventually, still be an exercise in discretion.
In practice, however, it would have to be expected that if the agents a and
b were really committed to their stance, they would not simply accept that F
correctly encodes the situation and that the choice is in fact arbitrary. Rather,
they would produce arguments to back up their position. It might be, for in-
stance, that agent a, who favors p, claims that q is inconsistent for some reason,
while agent b, who favors q, makes the same accusation against the argument p.
Then, however, we are no longer justified in seeing this as disagreement about
which choice to make from ε(F). Rather, the disagreement concerns the nature
of the argumentation structure itself. The two agents, in particular, put forth
different views on the situation. For instance, in our toy example, we would have
to consider the following two AFs, where Va, Vb encode the views of a and b
respectively.
Va : p:: 66 q
ww
Vb : p 66 q dd
ww
(1)
Then the question arises: what are we to make of this?
In the following, we address this question, and we approach it from the con-
ceptual starting point that evaluating (higher-order) differences of opinion such
as that expressed by Va, Vb takes place iteratively, through a process of delib-
eration, leading, in a step-by-step fashion, to an aggregated common F. Such a
process might be instantiated in various ways: it could the agents debating the
matter among themselves and reaching some joint decision, or it could be an
arbitrator who considers the different views and reasons about them by emulat-
ing such a process. Either way, we are not interested in attempting to provide
any guidance towards the “correct” outcome, which is hardly possible in gen-
eral. Rather, we are interested in investigating the modalities that arise when
we consider the space of all possible outcomes (where possible will be defined in
due course). Moreover, we are interested in investigating structural questions,
asking, for instance, about the importance of the order in which arguments are
considered, and the consequences of limiting attention to only a subset of argu-
ments.
We use a dynamic modal logic to facilitate this investigation, and in the
next section we define the basic framework and show that model checking is
decidable even on infinite AF’s, as long as the agent’s views remains finitely
branching, i.e., as long as no argument is attacked by infinitely many other
arguments. We will parameterize our logic by an argumentation semantics, so
that it can be applied to any such semantics which satisfies a normality condition.
In particular, let C(F) = {CF1 , . . . , CFi , . . .} denote the (possibly infinite) set of
maximal connected components from F (the set of all maximal subsets of S such
that any two arguments in the same set are connected by a sequence of attacks).
Then we say that a semantics ε is normal if we have, for any F = (S,E)
A ∈ ε(F)⇔ A =
⋃
i
Ai for some A1, . . . , Ai, . . . s.t. Ai ∈ ε(CFi ) for all i (2)
That is, a semantics is normal if the status of an argument depends only on
those arguments to which it has some (indirect) relationship through a sequence
of attacks. We remark that all argumentation semantics of which we are aware
satisfies this requirement, hence we feel justified in dubbing it normality.
3 Deliberative dynamic logic
We assume given a finite non-empty set A of agents and a countably infinite
set Π of arguments.3 The basic building block of dynamic deliberative logic is
provided in the following definition.
Definition 1. A basis for deliberation is an A-indexed collection of digraphs
B = (Va)(a∈A), such that for each a ∈ A, Va ⊆ Π ×Π.
Given a basis which encodes agents’ view of the arguments, we are interested
in the possible ways in which agents can deliberate to reach agreement on how
arguments are related. That is, we are interested in the set of all AFs that
can plausibly be seen as resulting from a consensus regarding the status of the
arguments in Π. What restrictions is it reasonable to place on a consensus? It
seems that while many restrictions might arise from pragmatic considerations,
and be implemented by specific protocols for “good” deliberation in specific
contexts, there are few restrictions that can be regarded as completely general.
For instance, while there is often good reason to think that the position held
by the majority will be part of a consensus, it is hardly possible to stipulate an
axiomatic restriction on the notion of consensus amounting to the principle of
majority rule. Indeed, sometimes deliberation takes place and leads to a single
dissenting voice convincing all the others, and often, these deliberative processes
are far more interesting than those that transpire along more conventional lines.
However, it seems reasonable to assume that whenever all agents agree on how
an argument p is related to an argument q, then this relationship is part of any
consensus. This, indeed, is the only restriction we will place on the notion of
a consensus; that when the AF F is a consensus for basis, it must satisfy the
following faithfulness requirement.
– For all p, q ∈ Π, if there is no disagreement about p’s relationship to q
(attack/not attack), then this relationship is part of F
3 Possibly “statements” or “positions”, depending on the context of application.
This leads to the following definition of the setÄ(B), which we will call the set
of complete assents for B, collecting all AFs that are faithful to B = (Va)(a∈A).
Ä(B) =
{
F ⊆ Π ×Π
∣∣∣∣∣ ⋂
a∈A
Va ⊆ F
⋃
a∈A
Va
}
(3)
An element of Ä(B) represents a possible consensus among agents in A, but
it is an idealization of the notion of assent, since it disregards the fact that
in practice, assent tends to be partial, since it results from a dynamic process,
emerging through deliberation. Indeed, as long as the number of arguments is
not bounded we can never hope to arrive at complete assent via deliberation.
We can, however, initiate a process by which we reach agreement on more and
more arguments, in the hope that this will approximate some complete assent, or
maybe even be robust, in the sense that there is no deliberative future where the
results of current partial agreement end up being undermined. Complete assent,
however, arises only in the limit.
When and how deliberation might successfully lead to an approximation of
complete assent is a question well suited to investigation with the help of dynamic
logic. The dynamic element will be encoded using a notion of a deliberative event
– centered on an argument – such that the set of ways in which to relate this
argument to arguments previously considered gives rise to a space of possible
deliberative time-lines, each encoding the continued stepwise construction of a
joint point of view. This, in turn, will be encoded as a monotonically growing
AF F = (S,E) where S ⊆ Π,E ⊆ S × S and such that faithfulness is observed
by all deliberative events. That is, an event consists of adding to F the agents’
combined view of p with respect to the set S ∪ {p}. This leads to the following
collection of possible events, given a basis B, a partial consensus4 F = (S,E) and
an argument p ∈ Π:
UB(F, p) =
{
X
∣∣∣∣∣ ⋂
a∈A
Va|S∪{p} ⊆ X ⊆
⋃
a∈A
Va|S∪{p}
}
(4)
To provide a semantics for a logical approach to deliberation based on such
events, we will use Kripke models.
Definition 2 (Deliberative Kripke model). Given an argumentation se-
mantics ε and a set of views B, the deliberative Kripke models induced by B
and ε is the triple K(B,ε) = (QB,RB, eε) such that
– QB, the set of points, is the set of all pairs of the form q = (qS , qE) where
qS ⊆ Π and ⋂
a∈A
Va|qS ⊆ qE ⊆
⋃
a∈A
Va|qS
4 These “partial consensuses” are sometimes referred to as “contexts” when they are
used to describe graphs inductively, as we will do later.
The basis B together with our definition of an event, given in Equation 4,
induces the following function, mapping states to their possible deliberative
successors, defined for all p ∈ Π, q ∈ QB as follows
succ(p, q) := { (qS ∪ {p}, qE ∪X) | X ∈ UB(q, p) }
We also define a lifting, for all states q ∈ QB:
succ(q) := { q′ | ∃p ∈ Π : q′ ∈ succ(q, p)}
– RB : Π ∪{∃} → 2QB×QB is a map from symbols to relations on QB such that
• RB(p) = {(q, q′) | q′ ∈ succ(p, q)} for all p ∈ Π and
• RB(∃) = {(q, q′) | q′ ∈ succ(q)},
– eε : QB → 2(3Π) maps states to labellings such that for all q ∈ QB we have
eε(q) = (pi1, pi0, pi 1
2
) with
eε(q) = {pi | pi1 ∈ ε(q), pi0 = {p ∈ qS | ∃q ∈ pi1 : (q, p) ∈ qE}}
Notice that in the last point, we essentially map q to the sets of extensions
prescribed by ε when q is viewed as an AF. We encode this extension as a three-
valued labeling, however, following [3]. Notice that the default status, attributed
to all arguments not in qS , is
1
2 . The logical language we will use consists in two
levels. For the lower level, used to talk about static argumentation, we follow
[1,6] in using  Lukasiewicz three-valued logic. Then, for the next level, we use a
dynamic modal language which allows us to express consequences of updating
with a given argument, and also provides us with existential quantification over
arguments, allowing us to express claims like “there is an update such that φ”.
This leads to the language LDDL defined by the following bnf’s
φ ::= α | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | 〈p〉φ | ♦φ
where p ∈ Π and α ∈ L where L is defined by the following grammar:
α ::= p | ¬φ | φ→ φ
for p ∈ Π.
We also use standard abbreviations such that φ = ¬♦¬φ, [p]φ = ¬〈p〉¬φ
and α = ¬¬α. We also consider that standard boolean connectives abbrevi-
ated as usual for connectives not occurring inside a -connective and abbrevia-
tions for connectives of  Lukasiewicz logic in the scope of -connectives.
Next we define truth of formulas on deliberative Kripke models. We begin by
giving the valuation of complex formulas from L, which is simply three-valued
 Lukasiewicz logic.
Definition 3 (α-satisfaction). For any three-partitioning pi = (pi1, pi0, pi 1
2
) of
Π, we define
pi(p) = x s.t p ∈ pix
pi(¬α) = 1− pi(α)
pi(α1 → α2) = min{1, 1− (pi(α1)− pi(α2))}
Now we can give a semantic interpretation of the full language as follows.
Definition 4 (LDDL-satisfaction). Given an argumentation semantics ε and
a basis B, truth on K(B,ε) is defined inductively as follows, in all points q ∈ QB.
K(B,ε), q  α ⇐⇒ there is pi ∈ eε(q) s.t. pi(φ) = 1
K(B,ε), q  ¬φ ⇐⇒ not K(B,ε), q  φ
K(B,ε), q  φ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ both K(B,ε), q  φ and K(B,ε), q  ψ
K(B,ε), q  〈pi〉p ⇐⇒ ∃(q, q′) ∈ RB(p) : K(B,ε), q′  φ
K(B,ε), q  ♦φ ⇐⇒ ∃(q, q′) ∈ RB(∃) : K(B,ε), q′  φ
To illustrate the definition, we return to the example depicted in (1). In
Figure 1, we depict this basis together with a fragment of the corresponding
Kripke model, in particular the fragment arising from the p-successors of (∅, ∅).
B =

Va : p:: 77 q
ww
Vb : p 77 q dd
ww
 〈p〉 〈p〉
〈q〉 〈q〉 〈q〉 〈q〉
p q
pp
p qp qp q
〈p〉
〈q〉
〈q〉
〈q〉
〈q〉
〈q〉
〈q〉
Fig. 1. A fragment of the deliberative Kripke model for B.
Let us assume that ε = p is the preferred semantics. Then the following list
gives some formulas that are true on K(B,ε) at the point (∅, ∅), and the reader
should easily be able to verify them by consulting the above fragment of K(B,ε).
〈p〉p, ♦p, [p]♦q,
¬[p]♦p, 〈p〉♦¬p, ♦♦(p ∧ q)
We can also record some validities that are easy to verify against Definition
2.
Proposition 1. The following formulas are all validities of LDDL, for any p, q ∈
Π, φ ∈ LDDL.
1. 〈p〉〈q〉φ↔ 〈q〉〈p〉φ
2. 〈p〉[q]φ→ [q]〈p〉φ
3. ♦φ→ ♦φ
4. 〈p〉〈p〉φ→ 〈p〉φ
We remark that [q]〈p〉φ → 〈p〉[q]φ is not valid, as witnessed for instance
by the following basis B, for which we have K(B,p), (∅, ∅) |= [q]〈p〉p but also
K(B,p), (∅, ∅) |= [p]〈q〉q (as the reader may easily verify by considering the
corresponding Kripke model).
B =
{
Va : p // q
Vb : p qoo
}
Finally, let us notice that as Π is generally infinite, we must expect to en-
counter infinite bases. This means, in particular, that our Kripke models are
often infinite. However, in the next section we show that as long as B is finitary,
meaning that no agent a ∈ A has a view where an argument is attacked by
infinitely many other arguments, we can solve the model-checking problem also
on infinite models.
4 Model checking on finitary models
Towards this result, we now introduce some notation and a few abstractions to
simplify our further arguments. We will work with labeled trees, in particular,
where we take a tree over labels X to be some non-empty, prefix-closed subset of
X∗ (finite sequences of elements of X). Notice that trees thus defined contain no
infinite sequences. This is intentional, since we will “shrink” our models (which
may contain infinite sequences of related points), by mapping them to trees. To
this end we will use the following structures.
Definition 5. Given a basis B, we define I(B), a set of sequences over Π × 2Π
labeled by AFs, defined inductively as follows
Base case:  ∈ I(B) and is labeled by the AF F() = (S(), E()) where S() =
∅ = E().
Induction step: If x ∈ I(B), then for any p ∈ Π and any partial assent
X = UB(x, p), we have x; (p,X) ∈ I(B) labeled by the AF F(x; (p,X)) where
S(x; (p,X)) = S(x) ∪ {p} and E(x; (p,X)) = E(x) ∪X.
To adhere to standard naming we use  to denote the empty string. It should
not be confused with the argumentation semantics ε. This will also be clear from
the context. We next define tree-representations of our Kripke models.
Definition 6. Let K(B,ε) be some model. The tree representation of K(B,ε) is
the set T , together with the representation map γ : QB → 2T , defined inductively
as follows
Base case  ∈ T is the root with γ((∅, ∅)) = {}.
Induction step For any x ∈ T, q ∈ K(B,ε) with x ∈ γ(q) and q′ ∈ succ(q)
witnessed by p ∈ Π and X ∈ UB(x, p), we have x; (p,X) ∈ T with q′ ∈
γ(x; (p,X)).
Notice that the tree-representation is a tree where each node is an element
of I(B). Some single states in K(B,ε) will have several representations in a tree.
That is, γ(q) may not be a singleton. On the other hand, it is easy to see that
for every state q ∈ K(B,ε), and every path from (∅, ∅) to q, there will be a node
x ∈ T such that q ∈ γ(x).
The main result of our paper is that model checking LDDL-truth at (∅, ∅)
is tractable as long as all views are finitely branching, i.e., such that for all
a ∈ A, p ∈ Π, p has only finitely many attackers in Va. Clearly this requires
shrinking the models since the modality ♦ quantifies over an infinite domain
whenever Π is infinite. We show, however, that attention can be restricted to
arguments from Π that are relevant to the formula we are considering. To make
the notion of relevance formal, we will need the following measure of complexity
of formulas.
Definition 7. The white modal depth of φ ∈ LDDL is |φ|♦ ∈ N, which is defined
inductively as follows
|α|♦ := 0 no white connectives in these formulas
|α|♦ := 0
|¬φ|♦ := |φ|♦ depth is deepest nesting of
|φ ∧ ψ|♦ := max{|φ|♦, |ψ|♦} white connectives
|♦φ|♦ := 1 + |φ|♦
|〈p〉φ|♦ := 1 + |φ|♦
We let Π|φ denote the set of arguments occurring in φ in sub-formulas from
L. Notice that given a state q ∈ QB, the satisfaction of a formula of the form
φ = α at the AF encoded by q is not dependent on the entire digraph q =
(qS , qE).
Indeed, this is what motivated our definition of normality for an argumen-
tation semantics, leading to the following simple lemma, which is the first step
towards shrinking Kripke structures for the purpose of model checking. Given a
model K(B,ε) and a state q ∈ QB, we let C(q, Φ) denote the digraph consisting
of all connected components from q which contains a symbol from Φ. Then we
obtain the following.
Lemma 1. Given a semantics ε and two bases B and B′, we have, for any two
states q ∈ K(B,ε) and q′ ∈ K(B′,ε) and for any formula φ ∈ LDDL with |φ|♦ = 0:(
C(q,Π|φ) = C(q′, Π|φ)
)⇒ (K(B,ε), q  φ⇔ K(B′,ε), q′  φ)
In order to complete our argument in this section, we will make use of n-
bisimulations modulo a set of symbols.
Definition 8. Given two models (with possibly different bases, but with common
set of symbols Π and semantic ε) KB = 〈QB, R, ε〉 and K ′B = 〈QB′ , R′, ε〉, states
q ∈ QB and q′ ∈ Q′B, a natural number n and a set Φ ⊆ Π, then we say that q
and q′ are n-bisimilar modulo Φ (denoted (KB, q) ↔Φn (KB′ , q′)), if, and only if,
there are n+ 1 relations relation Zn ⊆ Zn−1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Z0 ⊆ QB ×Q′B such that
1. qZnq
′,
2. whenever (v, v′) ∈ Z0, then C(v, Φ) = C(v′, Φ),
3. whenever (v, v′) ∈ Zi+1 and vRu, then there is a u′ s.t. v′R′u′ and uZiu′,
4. whenever (v, v′) ∈ Zi+1 and v′R′u′, then there is a u s.t. vRu and uZiu′.
Let us now also define a particular subset of arguments, the arguments which
have at most distance n from some given set of arguments:
Definition 9. Given a basis B = (Va)(a∈A), a subset Φ ⊆ Π and a number n,
the n-vicinity of Φ is D(B, Φ, i) ⊆ Π, defined inductively as follows
D(B, Φ, 0) = Φ
D(B, Φ, n+ 1) = D(B, Φ, n)
∪
{
p ∈ Π | ∃q ∈ D(B, Φ, n) : {(p, q), (q, p)} ∩
⋃
a∈A
Va 6= ∅
}
Notice that as long as Φ is finite and all agents’ views have finite branching,
then the set D is also finite. Also notice that an equivalent characterization of
the set D((Va)(a∈A) , Φ, i) can be given in terms of paths as follows: an argument
p ∈ Π is in D(B, Φ, i) if, and only if, there is a path p = x1x2 . . . xn in
⋃
a∈A Va
such that xn ∈ Φ and n ≤ i (we consider an argument p equivalently as an empty
path at p).
Definition 10. Given a formula φ ∈ LDDL. Let (Va)(a∈A) be a possibly infinite
basis , we define ρφ((Va)(a∈A)) such that
– for every a ∈ A, ρφ(Va) := Va ∩D(Va, Π|φ, |φ|♦)
Notice that the Kripke model for ρ(B) will have finite branching as long as
the argument symbols in the |φ|♦-vicinity of the argument symbols in φ have
finite branching in all agents’ views. In the following, we will show that for any
finitely branching B and normal ε, we have K(B,ε), (∅, ∅) |= φ if, and only if,
K(ρφ(B),ε), (∅, ∅) |= φ.
Theorem 1. Let B be an arbitrary basis , and φ ∈ LDDL.(K(B,ε), (∅, ∅)) ↔Π|φ|φ|♦ (K(ρφ(B),ε), (∅, ∅))
Proof. Let K(B,ε) be an arbitrary model and let T denote its tree representation,
while T ′ denotes the tree representation of K(ρφ(B),ε).
We take n = |φ|♦ and let Φ be the atoms occurring in φ inside the scope of
some -operator. Moreover, for brevity, we denote D = D(B, Φ, n).
Definition of (Zi)(0≤i≤|φ|♦): We define all the relations Zi inductively using the
tree-representations as follows.
Base case: (i = 0) For all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, we let Zi.
Induction step: (0 < i ≤ n) For all y = x; (v,X) ∈ T and y′ = x′; (v′, X ′) ∈
T ′, both of length i, with x(Zi+1)x′. We let, for every k ≤ i, y(Zk)y′ if, and
only if, v = v′, and X ∩ (D ×D) = X ′.
Notice that if x(Zi)x
′, then S(x) = S(x′) and |S(x)| ≤ (n− i). Moreover, by
consulting Definition 6 it is not hard to see that for all q ∈ QB, q′ ∈ Qρ(B) we
have, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n and all q ∈ QB, q′ ∈ Qρ(B):
∀x1, x2 ∈ γ(q) : ∀x′1, x′2 ∈ γ(q′) : x1(Zi)x2 ⇐⇒ x′1(Zi)x′2
This means, in particular, that the following lifting of (Zi)0≤i≤n to models is
well-defined, for all q ∈ QB, q′ ∈ Qρ(B) and all 0 ≤ i ≤ n:
q(Zi)q
′ ⇐⇒ x(Zi)x′
for some x ∈ γ(x), x′ ∈ γ(q′).
Next we show that (Zi)0≤i≤n so defined is an n-bisimulation between K(B,ε)
and K(ρ(B),ε).
(Zi)0≤i≤n witnesses n-bisimulation: We address all the points of the definition
of n-bisimulation modulo Φ in order.
1. Clearly, (∅, ∅)Zn(∅, ∅). Hence the first condition of the definition is satisfied.
2. Consider any arbitrary states q, q′ and let x = x1;x2; . . . ;xm and x′ =
x′1;x
′
2; . . . ;x
′
m be the corresponding nodes from T, T
′ that witnesses to q(Z0)q′.
By definition of Z0 we have S(x) = S(x
′), but it is possible that we have
E(x) 6= E(x′). However, we must have C(F(x), Φ) = C(F(x′), Φ), and to see
this, it is enough to observe that as m ≤ n, each of x and x′ contains at
most n nodes. Then, since F(x) = q and F(x′) = q′ are the same on D, and
the distance from Π \D to Φ is greater than n. That is, any path from an
argument in Π \D to an argument in Φ = Π|φ would be a path consisting of
at least n+1 nodes. It follows that no element from Φ can be in a connected
components containing elements outside of D.
3. Consider now q, q′ corresponding to x and x′ such that x(Zi+1)x′. Notice
that (q, r) ∈ RB(∃) if, and only if, there is a (p,X) such that xR(x; (p,X)).
So all we need to show is that X ∩ (D × D) is in Uρφ(B)(x′, p). Then it
will follow that there is a successor to x′, namely (p,X ∩ (D × D)), with
(x′)R′(x′; (p,X ∩ (D × D))). This is a straightforward consequence of the
Definition 10 of ρ. The argument for the particular sub relations RB(p) is
analogous.
4. Finally consider q, q′ corresponding to x and x′ such that x(Zi+1)x′ for
(p,X) such that x′R(x′; (p,X ′)). Again we need to ensure that there is an
X ∈ UB(x, p) such that X ′ = X ∩ (D ×D), and again this follows from the
Definition 10 of ρ. The argument for the particular sub relations RB(p) is
analogous.
Proposition 2. Let φ ∈ LDDL and B,B′ arbitrary bases. If states q ∈ K(B,ε) and
q′ ∈ K(B′,ε) are |φ|♦-bisimilar modulo Π|φ, then K(B,ε), q |= φ ⇔ K(B′,ε), q′ |= φ.
Or, succinctly(
(K(B,ε), q) ↔Π|φ|φ|♦ (K(B′,ε), q′)
)
⇒ (K(B,ε), q |= φ ⇔ K(B′,ε), q′ |= φ) .
Proof. The proof is by induction on |φ|♦.
Base case: (|φ|♦ = 0) There are no white connectives, and our states, q and q′,
are clearly 0-bisimilar modulo Φ. It is also easy to see, consulting Definition
2, that the truth of a formula of modal depth 0 is only dependent on the
AF q. Then it follows from the fact that ε is assumed to be normal that
the truth of φ is in fact only dependent on C(q, Φ). From q(Z0)q
′, we obtain
C(q, Φ) = C(q′, Φ) and the claim follows.
Induction step: (|φ|♦ > 0) We skip the boolean cases as these are trivial, so let
φ := ♦ψ (the case of white connectives with an explicit argument is similar).
Suppose |φ|♦ = i + 1 and q(Zi+1)q′. Suppose further that K(B,ε), q |= ♦ψ.
Then there is a successor of q, v ∈ succ(q) such that K(B,ε), v |= ψ. All
successors of q will be i-bisimilar to a successor of q′ (point 3. of Definition
8). So we have (K(B,ε), v) ↔Φi (K(B′,ε), v′). As |ψ|♦ < |♦ψ|♦ we can apply
our induction hypothesis to obtain K(B′,ε), v′ |= ψ, and K(B,ε), q′ |= ♦ψ as
desired.
5 Conclusion and future work
We have argued for a logical analysis of deliberative processes by way of modal
logic, where we avoid making restrictions that may not be generally applicable,
and instead focus on logical analysis of the space of possible outcomes. The
deliberative dynamic logic (ddl) was put forth as a concrete proposal, and we
showed some results on model checking.
We notice that ddl only allows us to study deliberative processes where
every step in the process is explicitly mentioned in the formula. That is, while
we quantify over the arguments involved and the way in which updates take
place, we do not quantify over the depth of the update. For instance, a formula
like ♦p reads that there is a deliberative update such that no matter what
update we perform next, we get φ. A natural next step is to consider instead a
formula ♦∗φ, with the intended reading that there is an update which not only
makes φ true, but ensures that it remains true for all possible future sequences
of updates. Introducing such formulas to the logic, allowing the deliberative
modalities to be iterated, is an important challenge for future work. Moreover,
we would also like to consider even more complex temporal operators, such as
those of computational tree logic, or even µ-calculus.
Finding finite representations for the deliberative truths that can be ex-
pressed in such languages appears to be much more challenging, but we would
like to explore the possibility of doing so.
Also, we would like to explore the question of validity for the resulting logics,
and the possibility of obtaining some compactness results. Indeed, it seems that
if we introduce temporal operators we will be able to express truths on arbitrary
points q ∈ QB by corresponding formulas that are true at (∅, ∅), thus capturing
the way in which complete assent can be faithfully captured by a finite (albeit
unbounded) notion of iterated deliberation.
If the history of the human race is anything to go by, it seems clear that
we never run out of arguments or controversy. But it might also be that some
patterns or structures are decisive enough that they warrant us to conclude that
the truth has been settled, even if deliberation may go on indefinitely. A further
logical inquiry into this and related questions will be investigated in future work.
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